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During the past decade,1 a lively debate has been per-
colating in an area of legal scholarship that has examined 
what has been variously described as departmentalism, 
constitutional Protestantism, coordinate construction, and 
nonjudicial constitutional interpretation.2 While exploring 
* Ph.D. candidate in Government, University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to 
Scott Gant, Jeff Tulis, H.W. Perry, and Sanford Levinson for their assistance in develop-
ing many of the ideas and arguments that inform this essay. Special thanks are also due 
to Steven Kaplan and Stephen Salkever for their help in refining individual portions of 
my analysis. 
1. One should note that there is, of course, scholarship on nonjudicial interpreta-
tion that predates this period. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and the Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893); Archibald Cox, 
The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. Cin. L. Rev. 199 (1971); 
Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and The National Political Process (U. of Chicago Press, 
1980); John Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy (Cornell U. 
Press, 1984). Regardless, the point remains that a flurry of interest in this topic seems to 
have developed relatively recently. 
Some of the contemporary attention directed at nonjudicial constitutional interpre-
tation seems to have been generated by a 1986 speech delivered by then Attorney Gen-
eral Edwin Meese, in which Meese argued that "constitutional interpretation is not the 
business of the Court only, but also properly the business of all branches of government." 
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979, 985 (1987). Meese's 
remarks prompted a number of responses from scholars and public officials and helped 
focus attention on constitutional interpretation by nonjudicial actors. See generally, 
Symposium, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 Tul. L. 
Rev. 977 (1987). 
2. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate 
Constitutional Interpreter, 48 Rev. Pol. 401 (1986) (on "departmentalism"); Sanford Lev-
inson, Constitutional Faith 27-53 (Princeton U. Press, 1988) (on constitutional "Protes-
tantism"); Choper, Judicial Review and The National Political Process (cited in note 1) 
(on "coordinate construction"); Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial In-
terpretation of the Constitution, 24 Hast. Const. L.Q. 359 (1997) (on "nonjudicial constitu-
tional interpretation"). 
This is certainly not an exhaustive list of the terms that have been used in this area 
of research. See, e.g., Keith Whittington, Reconstructing the Federal Judiciary: The Chase 
Impeachment and the Constitution, 9 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 55, 56 (1995) (describing "con-
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a wide range of theoretical issues and analyzing disparate 
circumstances and phenomena, this work is loosely unified 
by its general skepticism regarding claims that the federal 
judiciary has exclusive authority in interpreting the Consti-
tution, and its focus on what for many years has been an 
underdeveloped research topic: constitutional interpreta-
tion occurring outside the courts. 
The proliferation of this scholarship has produced two 
unsurprising consequences. First, the suggestion by nu-
merous scholars that we should give greater attention to 
nonjudicial constitutional interpretation has provoked 
something of a normative backlash by defenders of judicial 
supremacy-the doctrine that the Supreme Court has the 
ultimate say in interpreting the Constitution. Perhaps most 
prominent in these critiques is the claim that recognizing 
the interpretive authority of nonjudicial actors would jeop-
ardize the authoritative settlement function of law.3 Sec-
ond, while the swell of interest in interpretation outside the 
courts has generated a growing body of sophisticated 
scholarship and the evaluation of an increasingly wide am-
bit of legal and political problems, it has also tended to ob-
scure precisely what is being analyzed, and has led to nu-
merous scholars needlessly talking past one another instead 
of attempting to build upon and integrate their diverse re-
search projects. 
Two recent articles, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation by Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer4 
and Ducking Dred Scott: A Response to Alexander and 
Schauer by Emily Sherwin,5 reflect these two developments 
and serve as useful entry points for considering the 
strengths and weaknesses of the burgeoning body of schol-
arship examining alternatives to judicial supremacy. On 
the one hand, several flaws in these authors' analyses can 
be attributed to their mistaken and undeveloped assump-
stitutional construction" by Congress). For convenience, I will use the terms "nonjudicial 
constitutional interpretation" or "nonjudicial interpretation" to refer generally to this 
diverse body of work. 
3. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Meese, the Lawman, Calls for Anarchy, New York Times 
E25 (Nov. 2, 1986); Burt Neubome, The Binding Quality of Supreme Coun Precedent, 61 
Tul. L. Rev. 991, 1000 (1987). 
4. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev.1359 (1997). 
5. Emily Sherwin, Ducking Dred Scott· A Response to Alexander and Schauer, 15 
Const. Comm. 65 (1998). 
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tions about the meaning and implications of a normative 
commitment to nonjudicial constitutional interpretation. 
But a second set of shortcomings in these two essays points 
not only to problems inherent in these texts, but to difficul-
ties that tend to afflict the entire body of work examining 
nonjudicial interpretation, whether critical or supportive; 
thus, some of the weaknesses in Alexander, Schauer, and 
Sherwin's analyses mirror defects in the relevant legal lit-
erature as a whole. 
This essay begins by examining the arguments pre-
sented in On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation and 
Ducking Dred Scott to illustrate a general set of miscon-
ceptions that permeate work criticizing calls for a greater 
diffusion of interpretive responsibility, misconceptions that 
could be corrected by a closer review of existing scholar-
ship and a greater appreciation for the ways in which 
scholars sympathetic to nonjudicial interpretation could re-
spond to many of the objections leveled against their re-
search. On the basis of this preliminary analysis, one might 
well conclude that research generally supportive of consti-
tutional interpretation outside the courts is in a healthy, 
robust state, and deserves more nuanced treatment in fu-
ture scholarly exchanges. But in reviewing a second set of 
defects that run through Alexander, Schauer, and 
Sherwin's analyses, this essay suggests that much important 
work remains to be done for both those advocating and 
those resisting a movement away from an interpretive sys-
tem dominated by the courts. 
I. LEGAL SETILEMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 
On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation makes a 
case against the position "that judges should not be the ex-
clusive and authoritative interpreters of the Constitution."6 
According to the authors, the nature and function of law 
requires authoritative constitutional interpretation by the 
federal judiciary overseen by the Supreme Court, an ar-
rangement that will best safeguard the values of "settle-
ment and stability."7 Accordingly, Alexander and Schauer 
6. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1359 (cited in note 4). 
7. Id at 1380. 
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embrace "judicial primacy without qualification, "8 and urge 
nonjudicial officials to demonstrate interpretive "defer-
ence" in the face of this primacy. Even if an official deems 
a Supreme Court decision mistaken, he or she should give 
the Court wide latitude9 to ensure that the law remains sta-
ble and determinate.10 As the authors put it, "at times good 
institutional design requires norms that compel decision-
makers to defer to the judgments of others with which they 
disagree. "11 
Alexander and Schauer's argument rests on three cen-
tral claims, each of which can be distinguished and criti-
cized on its own terms. First, their analysis suggests that 
the benefits yielded by authoritative settlement-stability, 
reliability, and coordination-are preeminent constitu-
tional and legal values. Second, they assert that these val-
ues can only be secured through a single authoritative in-
terpreter. Finally, they make a case that this role is best 
served by the Court. 
The first proposition in Alexander and Schauer's over-
all argument is that "authoritative settlement" is an essen-
tial aspect of constitutionalism.12 The authors defend this 
settlement function as a critical aspect of all law, and as es-
pecially important in a constitutional context, where a con-
stitution's claim to supremacy over other forms of law 
makes it a particularly suitable basis for coordinating and 
stabilizing legal decisions.13 An authoritative constitution 
(presided over by an authoritative interpreter) settles 
"what ought to be done" in a pluralistic society by provid-
8. Id at 1362. 
9. "Wide latitude" is not synonymous with absolute deference, of course, and Al-
exander and Schauer's concession that nonjudicial actors' responsibility to uphold the 
Court's rulings are "overridable" serves as the basis of Sherwin's critique of their argu-
ment. See id at 1382 (discussing Lincoln's justification in resisting the Court's decision in 
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) despite his general obligation to support its de-
cisions); see also text accompanying notes 45-49 (describing Sherwin's objection to Alex-
ander and Schauer's analysis). 
10. Unless otherwise noted, I will associate this basic position of Alexander and 
Schauer's with the term "judicial supremacy." 
11. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1387 (cited in note 4). 
12. ld at 1371. 
13. Alexander Bickel made something of the same argument in suggesting that 
there is "a strong interest ... in the uniform construction and application of the Constitu-
tion as against inconsistent state law throughout the country." Alexander Bickel, The 
Least Dangerous Branch 13 (The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1962). Given this need for uni-
formity, Bickel concluded that "it is obviously sensible to lodge the [coordinating] func-
tion ... [chiefly] in the federal judiciary." ld 
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ing "uniform decisions on issues as to which people have 
divergent substantive views and personal agendas."14 
Authoritative law, they argue, also helps coordinate ato-
mistic, self-interested actors and promote common inter-
ests that might otherwise be hard to achieve.15 In addition, 
"settlement for settlement's sake"16 may be essential in 
providing a stable environment or medium particularly 
conducive to certain desirable social objectives-like eco-
nomic growth.17 Finally, we might value law's stability to 
promote a sense of "law abidingness" and reverence for the 
law amongst politicians and citizens.18 
Alexander and Schauer conclude that in order to pro-
vide the goods associated with legal settlement and stabil-
ity, we must bolster the Constitution's authority, "and in-
trinsic to the concept of authority is that it provides 
content-independent reasons for action."19 After the courts 
supply an authoritative resolution to a constitutional issue, 
other officials should defer to this ruling regardless of 
whether they support the outcome or its underlying justifi-
cation, simply because a decision has been made. "[A]n 
authoritative constitution has normative force even for an 
agent who believes its directives to be mistaken."20 In the 
eyes of Alexander and Schauer, it is more important to get 
things settled than to get them right, at least with respect to 
constitutional law and interpretation.21 
14. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1376 (cited in note 4). 
15. An example of this might be what Mancur Olson identified as "public goods," 
goods whose attainment is frustrated by individual incentives to avoid contributing to 
them. See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard U. Press, 1965). 
While Alexander and Schauer do not mention Olson by name, their analysis here is cer-
tainly consistent with his work. 
16. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1376 (cited in note 4). 
17. For the argument from economics, see the studies collected in George J. Stigler, 
ed., Chicago Studies in Political Economy (U. of Chicago Press, 1988). 
18. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1375 (cited in note 4). Cf. Feder-
alist 25 (Hamilton), The Federalist Papers 162, 167 (Arlington House, 1966), Federalist 49 
(Madison) at 315 (discussing the value of "reverence" for the law); Sanford Levinson, 
"Veneration" and Constitutional Change: James Madison Confronts the Possibility of 
Constitutional Amendment, 21 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 2443, 2452-55 (1990) (discussing legal 
veneration and constitutional change). 
19. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1361 (cited in note 4). 
20. Id. 
21. Id at 1363. In this way, Alexander and Schauer's position appears to mirror 
that adopted by Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) in which he stated that "[w]e [members of the 
Court] are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final." Of course, regardless of whether Jackson's point is desirable as a normative 
proposition, its empirical validity has certainly been disputed. See, e.g., Gant, 24 Hast. 
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The difficulty at this initial stage of Alexander and 
Schauer's argument is not so much their contention as their 
emphasis. Settlement and stability are indeed critical con-
stitutional values and their promotion should be an impor-
tant consideration in thinking about who should interpret 
the Constitution. But the overall tenor of Alexander and 
Schauer's remarks suggests that instead of being one value 
in competition with others, legal settlement has a determi-
native or trumping normative force. To be fair, the authors 
do note that "ls]tability and coordination are not the only 
functions that a constitution serves,"22 and go even further 
to suggest that "at times [nonjudicial] decisionmakers will, 
and should, conclude that reaching the morally correct re-
sult in the instant case is worth weakening the institution 
[the Supreme Court] that is expected to produce the mor-
ally best array of decisions in the long term."23 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, however, there 
remain "good reasons for society to compel ... officials to 
follow laws and interpretations that the officials believe to 
be mistaken. "24 At the end of the day, the settlement and 
coordination functions of law must weigh heavily in our 
political calculus and we must not forget that "an impor-
tant-perhaps the important-function of law is its ability 
to settle authoritatively what is to be done."25 The overall 
implication of their argument is that we ought to structure 
our system of constitutional interpretation to give the val-
ues of "stability and coordination" the highest priority. 
But emphasizing the connection between constitu-
tional interpretation and legal stability might compromise 
other constitutional commitments, especially in the absence 
of any understanding of what institutional and political 
mechanisms will be used to advance and protect these 
ends. Consider, in this regard, the remarks of former At-
torney General Edwin Meese: "[e]ach of the three coordi-
nate branches of government created and empowered by 
the Constitution- the executive and legislative no less than 
the judicial-has a duty to interpret the Constitution in the 
Const. L.Q. at 399 (cited in note 2) (explaining that judicial decisions are "never truly 
final"). 
22. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1376 (cited in note 4). 
23. Id at 1382-83 n.93. 
24. Id at 1375. 
25. Id at 1377 (emphasis added). 
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performance of its official functions. "26 There are at least 
three general ways in which the fundamental operations 
and purposes of the three branches of government might 
well be compromised if constitutional interpretation were 
relegated solely to the courts.27 
First, each department must interpret the Constitution 
as part of the performance of enumerated duties. 28 Absent 
some independent constitutional interpretation, we might 
wonder, for example, how Senators would comprehend and 
apply their "Advice and Consent" responsibilities to the 
peculiarities of each confirmation case, or how Presidents 
would know what "extraordinary Occasions" justified their 
convening either or both houses of Congress.29 The need 
for nonjudicial interpretation in understanding and exer-
cising these and other duties seems particularly pressing in 
a constitutional system like that of the United States, in 
which federal powers are understood as enumerated and 
limited. Presidents and Congresses seeking to exercise 
their constitutional tools and prerogatives need, at a mini-
26. Meese, 61 Tul. L. Rev. at 985-986 (cited in note 1). Cf. James Madison, 4 Let-
ters and Other Writings of James Madison 349 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1867) (stating that 
"each (branch of government] must in the exercise of its functions be guided by the text 
of the Constitution according to its own interpretation of it"). 
27. One might object that this argument inappropriately conflates judicial suprem-
acy with "judicial exclusivity," the notion that the courts alone can determine constitu-
tional meaning. Allowing the courts to offer authoritative constitutional interpretations 
need not crowd out nonjudicial interpretation that is ultimately respectful of the courts' 
supreme interpretive position. See, e.g., Gant, 24 Hast. Const. L.Q. at 390 (cited in note 
2) (arguing for a system of judicial supremacy that still encourages "the participation of 
nonjudicial actors in the interpretive process"). 
While it is true that judicial supremacy need not foreclose subordinate nonjudicial 
interpretation, one might wonder how meaningful, effective, and energetic these inter-
pretations would be in an environment ultimately controlled and supervised by the judi-
ciary, especially in a political system premised on giving vent to ambition through indi-
vidually rewarding (and publicly beneficial) political actions. Cf. Thayer, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 
at 155-56 (cited in note 1) (arguing that the rise of judicial supremacy will lead to Con-
gress' increasing reluctance to consider constitutional questions independently). At any 
rate, Alexander and Schauer insist that nonjudicial agents should, on the whole, refrain 
from any sort of independent interpretation, even where this does not appear to conflict 
with existing Court decisions. See Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1385 
(cited in note 4). For Alexander and Schauer, judicial supremacy does seem largely syn-
onymous with judicial exclusivity. 
28. See generally Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers 
and Constitutional Meaning (forthcoming, 1999) (analyzing several different moments of 
"constitutional construction" by nonjudicial actors and demonstrating how these con-
structions critically informed the meaning of important constitutional provisions). 
29. See U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2 (outlining the Senate's "Advice and Consent" 
duties) and U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3 (the President "may, on extraordinary Occasions, 
convene both Houses, or either of them"). 
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mum, to comprehend the basic parameters of these pow-
ers.30 
In addition to invoking understandings of the Constitu-
tion as part of the fulfillment of particular duties, each de-
partment must rely on interpretation in its cultivation and 
assertion of a distinctive institutional role, that is related to, 
but not wholly subsumed by, the specific obligations and 
powers laid out in the constitutional text.31 Thus, for exam-
ple, the President's conception of "the executive Power"-
and the special responsibilities it gives rise to-should draw 
upon not just formally delineated Article II activities, but 
the purposes and aspirations of the Constitution as a 
whole. 
Nonjudicial constitutional interpretation might also 
play a critical part in helping to fulfill incidental depart-
mental functions, that is, special operations or tasks that are 
performed secondarily, in the course of pursuing enumer-
ated duties and assumed institutional roles. For example, 
in addition to their particular functions and more general 
responsibilities to the republic and its citizenry, legislative, 
executive, and judicial officials contribute (often unwit-
tingly) to an overall institutional scheme in which liberty is 
preserved through countervailing powers.32 While con-
signing interpretive processes to the courts might reduce 
certain kinds of interinstitutional conflict, the very reduc-
tion of this conflict would also work against some of the 
goals of the constitutional separation of powers.33 
30. Concern for the former issue seems to have been the impetus behind the 
•·Enumerated Powers Act," a bill introduced on January 7, 1997, by Rep. John Shadegg, 
"[t]o require Congress to specify the source of authority under the United States Consti-
tution for the enactment of laws, and for other purposes." The bill's second section 
specified that "[e]ach Act of Congress shall contain a concise and definite statement of 
the constitutional authority relied upon for the enactment of each portion of that Act. 
The failure to comply with this section shall give rise to a point of order in either House 
of Congress." H.R. 292, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 7, 1997). 
31. Cf. Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency 41-45 (Princeton U. Press, 1987) 
(examining the distinctive constitutional roles of each of the federal departments). 
32 Federalist 51 (Madison) (cited in note 18) (explaining how the Constitution pre-
serves liberty and avoids tyranny by "divid[ing] and arrang[ing] the several offices in such 
a manner as that each may be a check on the other"). 
33. We might recall in this regard Justice Louis Brandeis' dissent in Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) in which he argued that "the doctrine of the separation of 
powers was adopted [not] to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction 
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to 
save the people from autocracy." But see Louis Fisher, The Allocation of Powers: The 
Framers' Intent in Barbara B. Knight, ed., Separation of Powers in the American Political 
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One should note that none of the independent inter-
pretive activities discussed here need threaten the auton-
omy or even the ultimate authority of the courts. Instead, 
they could simply provide helpful legal and political infor-
mation to nonjudicial and judicial bodies alike, clarifying 
the different departments' understanding of basic constitu-
tional responsibilities and powers. At any rate, even where 
legal stability or settlement might be compromised by 
nonjudicial interpretations, this increase in instability 
would have to be measured against the accruing benefits. 
Setting aside Alexander and Schauer's claims about 
the primacy of legal settlement and the need for an 
"authoritative constitution" to achieve this stability, it is 
still questionable whether the next component of their ar-
gument follows-that this stability can only be achieved by 
a single interpreter. Alexander and Schauer briefly con-
sider the possibility that "each official [would] decide for 
herself what the Constitution requires" but they dismiss 
this approach as not sufficiently supporting the settlement 
function of constitutionallaw.34 "To the extent that the law 
is interpreted differently by different interpreters, an over-
whelming probability for many socially important issues 
[under the multiple-interpreter model], it has failed to per-
form the settlement function."35 
Both as an analytic and empirical question, this argu-
ment against interpretive pluralism is certainly worthy of 
debate. Alexander and Schauer's commitment to a strict 
regime of judicial supremacy in the name of legal stability 
seems to ignore other creative, flexible, and pragmatic in-
terpretive arrangements that do not obviously foster legal 
instability. A review of recent scholarship and past Ameri-
can political practices provides substantial evidence that 
vigorous nonjudicial constitutional interpretation need not 
produce confusion about constitutional meaning or an ob-
vious degeneration of the settlement function of law.36 In-
System (George Mason U. Press, 1989) (arguing that the American separation of powers 
was designed to promote efficient administration). 
34. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1377 (cited in note 4). 
35. Id. 
36. See, e.g., David Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 
1789-1801 at 296 (U. of Chicago Press, 1997) (illustrating numerous instances of nonjudi-
cial constitutional interpretation in the early years of the republic and noting that 
"[d]uring a period in which the Supreme Court wrote opinions in only a handful of con-
stitutional cases, Congress and the executive resolved a breathtaking variety of constitu-
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deed, several scholars have argued that a greater diffusion 
of interpretive responsibility might allow for what is ulti-
mately a deeper consensus about constitutional meaning as 
a variety of political actors engage in and legitimate the in-
terpretive process.37 
Notwithstanding these observations, one might accept 
part of Alexander and Schauer's argument-that the courts 
are essential for promoting legal stability-without adher-
ing to their conclusion that we must therefore embrace 
them as the authoritative and exclusive interpreters of the 
Constitution. Alternatively, we could see the courts as part 
of an interpretive system in which the "structures of each 
branch [are] differentiated in order to equip each branch to 
perform different tasks. "38 Thus, protecting legal settle-
ment and stability could be part of the special responsibili-
ties of the courts while the other branches invoke the Con-
stitution in pursuit of their specialized institutional roles 
and responsibilities.39 
Even if one accepts the first two components of Alex-
ander and Schauer's argument-that legal settlement is a 
critical value of constitutionalism, and that it is best pre-
tiona! issues great and small"); Choper, Judicial Review and The National Political Proc-
ess at 260-379 (cited in note 1) (outlining a number of occasions in which the legislative 
and executive branches negotiated issues touching on questions of constitutional mean-
ing without prompting a legal or political impasse); Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power 
(U. Press of Kansas, 1995) (explaining how the parameters of presidential war powers in 
the 19th century were gradually established through back-and-forth political processes 
between Congress and the President); Whittington, Constitutional Construction (cited in 
note 28) (portraying moments of nonjudicial constitutional construction including the 
impeachments of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson, 
the nullification crisis, and reforms of presidential-congressional relations during the 
Nixon era); Susan R. Burgess, Contest for Constitutional Authority: The Abortion and 
War Powers Debates 113 (U. Press of Kansas, 1992) (noting that "[t)he practice of de-
partmentalism in [her] abortion case [study) did not create anything as drastic as chaos or 
anarchy"). 
37. See Gary Jacobsohn, Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspira-
tion 10 (Rowman & Littlefield, 1986) (arguing for a model of constitutional interpreta-
tion built upon "a collective enterprise involving the inputs of more than one institution" 
and the public); Burgess, Contest for Constitutional Authority: The Abortion and War 
Powers Debates at 23 (cited in note 36) (suggesting that interpretive pluralism "should 
broaden constitutional authority and remind disputants of their similarities, even as they 
strive to clarify grounds for their differences"). 
38. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency at 41 (cited in note 31}. 
39. This conception of constitutional interpretation is hardly alien to American 
politics. It seems fully consistent with Abraham Lincoln's views in resisting the Court's 
decision in Dred Scott. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed., 1 Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and 
Writings 1832-1858 at 741 (Library of America, 1989) (explaining that while he will rec-
ognize all Court decisions protecting the interests of slave owners, he will nevertheless 
oppose those decisions "as a political rule"). 
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served by an authoritative interpreter- their analysis still 
depends upon the additional claim that this authoritative 
interpreter must be the judiciary directed by the Supreme 
Court. Put somewhat differently, one might agree with Al-
exander and Schauer's argument about the necessity of 
authoritative settlement as a basis for interinstitutional in-
terpretive consistency and coordination while still ques-
tioning their choice of means. Scholars have proposed that 
either the legislative or executive branch might serve as the 
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution (at least under 
some conditions).40 Might not one of these approaches ac-
cord with Alexander and Schauer's commitment to finality 
and stability as cherished constitutional values? 
While Alexander and Schauer do not explore this 
question at length, it is evident throughout their article that 
they are specifically attached to judicial supremacy as the 
foundation for a system of constitutional interpretation. In 
a footnote, they defend the legitimacy of exclusive Court 
interpretation (as opposed to exclusive interpretation by 
the legislature or executive) by invoking supposed institu-
tional advantages of the Court, including its ability to resist 
the "excesses" of "majoritarian forces," its presumed supe-
riority in "determin[ing] the contours of the constraints on 
its own power" and its adherence to "precedential con-
straint."4 While each of these points is debatable on its 
own,42 it is also not entirely clear what the relationship is 
40. See Murphy, 48 Rev. Pol. at 410-411, 420 n.28 (cited in note 2) (outlining the 
case for both legislative and executive constitutional interpretation). For commentary 
supporting the executive branch's interpretive authority see Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905 (1990); Michael S. Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is 83 Geo. L.J. 217 (1994 ). For 
scholarship generally supportive of congressional power to interpret the Constitution see 
Cox, 40 U. Cin. L. Rev. 199 (cited in note 1), Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation 
by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 707 (1985); Eugene W. Hickok, The Framers' 
Understanding of Constitutional Deliberations in Congress, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 217 (1986); 
Mark Tushnet, The Constitution Outside the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry, 26 Val. U. L. 
Rev. 437 (1992). 
41. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1377 n.80 (cited in note 4). 
42. For research raising questions about the Court's ability to resist majoritarian 
and other political pressures, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The 
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 61. Pub. L. 279 (1957), David G. Barnum, 
The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal 
Period, 47 1. Pol. 652 (1985); Robert McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (U. of 
Chicago Press, 1994) among many others. Scholarship skeptical about the Court's ca-
pacity to constrain its own powers includes Nathan Glazer, Toward an Imperial Judiciary, 
41 Pub. Int. 104 (Fall1975), Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment (Harvard U. Press, 1977); Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. 
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between the first two contentions-that the Court is able to 
resist democratic impulses and is a better judge of its own 
institutional limits-and Alexander and Schauer's analysis 
of the virtues of authoritative settlement. While a plausible 
case could be made that these distinctive judicial qualities 
promote legal settlement, the case does have to be made, 
and must also be considered against competing arguments 
for authoritative interpretation by the other branches. One 
might consider, for example, whether the "unity" of the ex-
ecutive or the potential for strong partisan leadership and 
organization in Congress would make these more suitable 
institutions for promoting interpretive stability.43 Finally, 
one can also question Alexander and Schauer's argument 
for judicial supremacy by pointing to scholarship suggesting 
that "authoritative" Supreme Court decisions may prolong 
and intensify certain debates.44 
II. TAKING AUTHORITATIVE SETTLEMENT 
SERIOUSLY 
In Ducking Dred Scott: A Response to Alexander and 
Schauer, Emily Sherwin takes issue not with Alexander and 
Schauer's basic defense of judicial supremacy or the set-
tlement values they esteem so highly, but with their ap-
Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge U. Press, 1993). On 
the question of how well the Court follows precedent, see Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature 
of the Judicial Process 142-80 (Yale U. Press, 1921) (suggesting the inconstancy of reli-
ance on precedent); David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in David Kairys, ed., The Politics of 
Law, A Progressive Critique 11-17 (Pantheon Books, 1982); Saul Brenner and Harold J. 
Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court, 1946-1992 
(Cambridge U. Press, 1995). 
43. See, e.g., Easterbrook, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 918 (cited in note 40) ("A 
unitary Executive always does better at avoiding chaos than does a hydra-headed, unco-
ordinated judiciary."). 
44. See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About 
Social Change? (U. of Chicago Press, 1991); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on 
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375, 381-83 (1985). 
In addition to all of these concerns, if one takes Alexander and Schauer's thesis seriously, 
one would have to consider what institutional arrangements within the judiciary would 
best promote the goals of authoritative legal settlement. Would it be appropriate, for 
example, to eliminate concurring opinions in order to maximize judicial clarity and law's 
settlement function? Should we insist upon a judicial supermajority {perhaps 6-3 or 7-2) 
to reverse previous Court decisions? These and other institutional changes might seem 
implicitly supported by Alexander and Schauer's noting that "our. argument assumes th~t 
Supreme Court decisions provide more clarity than the conshtutwnal text alone. [Judi-
cial supremacy] would hardly be justifiable if decisions of the Court tended to obfuscate 
and unsettle rather than clarify and settle." Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 
1377 n.79 (cited in note 4). 
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proach to supporting these ends. According to Sherwin, 
the authors' argument is dangerously "qualified" in allow-
ing a general commitment to obey the Court's rulings to be 
overridden in certain circumstances.45 As Sherwin explains, 
Alexander and Schauer's "rule of obedience" to Court de-
cisions is not "to be followed in every case to which it ap-
plies. It is simply a consideration, of some undetermined 
weight, in favor of official obedience in most cases."46 Alex-
ander and Schauer's version of judicial supremacy seems to 
require political actors to assess the value of legal settle-
ment relative to other goods when deciding whether to 
obey the decisions of the Court. 
The problem with this approach, according to Sherwin, 
is that it is ultimately fatal to a "rule of obedience" and to 
the "settlement, stability, and coordination" values this rule 
is designed to secure.47 Allowing nonjudicial political actors 
to exercise any discretion in considering whether to uphold 
courts' decisions will inevitably produce errors and variet~ 
in their judgments, corroding "authoritative settlement." 
Sherwin proposes that we correct this flaw in Alexander 
and Schauer's analysis by adopting a "serious" or absolute 
rule of obedience to the decisions of the Supreme Court. 
As she explains, "there is reason, from a systemic perspec-
tive, to insist that all officials must obey the decisions of the 
Court, in all cases. "49 
Sherwin concedes that her serious rule of obedience 
might generate some unfortunate results, including the 
possibility that interpretive errors by the Court would per-
sist indefinitely. 50 But, "over the long run the sum of errors 
by [nonjudicial] officials, including their underestimation of 
45. Sherwin, 15 Const. Comm. at 65 (cited in note 5). 
46. Id at 67 (emphasis added). 
47. Id at 66. As Sherwin puts it, "[s]ettlement, stability, and coordination are im-
portant goods that can only be had through a general practice of obedience to rules." Id. 
at 66 (emphasis added). Sherwin's equation of rules with the values of "settlement, sta-
bility, and coordination" is at odds with scholarship pointing out that stable social ar-
rangements, or "spontaneous orders" can emerge from aggregations of unorganized hu-
man activity. See, e.g., F. A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, 96-
105 (U. of Chicago Press, 1967); N. Barry, The Tradition of Spontaneous Order, 5 Litera-
ture of Liberty 7-58 (1982). 
48. Sherwin, 15 Const. Comm. at 69 (cited in note 5). Leaving assessments of these 
other values to nonjudicial officials is too risky, Sherwin argues, even if these officials are 
required to give stability a "presumptive" worth, that is, an assumed priority that could 
still be overcome when weighed against competing values. 
49. Id at 68. 
50. Id at 66. 
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settlement values, will exceed the errors brought about by 
obedience to decisions of the Court," even mistaken deci-
sions.51 Moreover, even with a strict rule of obedience, 
Sherwin would allow political figures to criticize the 
Court's rulings, albeit at the risk of formal and informal 
sanctions. 52 
To the extent that Sherwin attempts to present a 
strengthened case for judicial supremacy and the settle-
ment values championed by Alexander and Schauer, her 
analysis appears to be even more vulnerable to some of the 
objections raised against On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation. Sherwin's steadfast commitment to the 
benefits of authoritative settlement prompts her to argue 
against Alexander and Schauer's modest allowance for dis-
agreements with the Court's interpretations in unusual 
cases such as Dred Scott v. Sanford, famously resisted by 
President Abraham Lincoln. Any deviation from a rule of 
obedience to Court decisions is deemed subversive to the 
stabilizing effects of the rule of law. But it is not at all ob-
vious that the stability of a rule generally adhered to 
("stop at a red light") will be compromised if it can be 
overcome in unusual situations requiring individual discre-
tion ("except when it is obviously broken").53 Moreover, it 
is not clear that the conceded goods of settlement, stability 
and coordination should be given priority over all other le-
gal and constitutional values, or that they can only be pro-
tected by authoritatively binding interpretations of the Su-
preme Court. 
In addition, Sherwin's efforts to improve Alexander 
and Schauer's model of judicial supremacy give rise to a 
problem unique to her argument. How are we to under-
51. Id at 70. 
52. Id at 71. 
53. While state laws often include an exception to the general "stop at a red light" 
rule for emergency vehicles, they do not necessarily recognize a "broken traffic signal" 
exception. In Massachusetts, for example, a person driving through a malfunctioning 
traffic signal is technically in violation of the general rule requiring vehicles to stop at a 
red light. Interview with Steven Kaplan, Officer, Brookline Police Department, in 
Brookline, MA (November 1, 1998). See Mass. Gen. L., ch. 89, § 7B (1994) (authorizing 
emergency vehicles to operate "contrary to any traffic signs or signals regulating traffic" 
as long as the operator brings the vehicle to a full stop and "proceeds with caution"); 
Mass. Gen. L., ch. 89, § 9 (1994) (authorizing the designation of locations where traffic 
must stop); Mass. Regs. Code, tit. 350, § 4.01(7) (1997) (describing the general rule for a 
stop sign or traffic signal); Mass. Regs. Code, tit. 720, § 9.06(10)(e) (19%) (describing the 
rule for a red light). 
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stand the legal status of those who disobey the Court and 
seek to resist its decisions? For Sherwin, "all officials must 
obey the decisions of the Court, in all cases." A govern-
ment official who disobeys a decision of the Court is "vio-
lating a rule of constitutional interpretation" and challeng-
ing the "stability of constitutional law."54 But how are we 
to assess this individual's disobedience as a legal and con-
stitutional matter? Is this person a "constitutional rene-
gade," operating outside of the parameters and commit-
ments of constitutional law (and to be evaluated therefore, 
by the constraints of realpolitik, or perhaps by standards 
provided by political philosophy)? Or are there other rules 
of constitutional interpretation, other constitutional values 
besides stability, such that a person might violate Sherwin's 
rule of judicial obedience and still retain fidelity to the 
Constitution? Sherwin gives us incomplete guidance on 
these questions, making it difficult to know how a respon-
sible constitutional citizen operating under her interpretive 
system would even begin to assess the actions of a contem-
porary Lincoln resisting a decision as objectionable as Dred 
Scott. 
III. DEFINITIONS AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Having suggested a number of ways in which both On 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation and Ducking 
Dred Scott fail to consider existing scholarship as well as 
the full implications of their own analyses, I now turn to 
two additional sorts of problems affecting not only these 
texts but most of the literature examining nonjudicial in-
terpretation. One might first note that Alexander, 
Schauer, Sherwin, as well as the bulk of the work they are 
indirectly criticizing, give insufficient attention to defini-
tional issues, to describing precisely what is being analyzed 
and proposed (and consequently, what is excluded from 
consideration). The two articles considered here also suf-
fer from a second set of shortcomings stemming from their 
exclus~v~ relia~ce .on normativ~ an~ theoretical approaches 
to their .mvestlgatl?ns and their .failure to consider empiri-
cal studies that might usefully mform, contextualize and 
test their claims and conclusions. This limitation al;o re-
54. Sherwin, 15 Const. Cornrn. at 71 (cited in note 5) (emphasis added). 
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fleets a tendency within the broader literature examining 
nonjudicial interpretation, which frequently focuses on ei-
ther normative or empirical issues, while devoting little at-
tention to how these two sorts of inquiries might fruitfully 
inform one another. In surfacing these two kinds of "symp-
tomatic" problems in Alexander, Schauer, and Sherwin's 
arguments, I hope to illustrate their importance and begin 
an argument (further developed in my conclusion) in-
tended to demonstrate why attending to these issues should 
comprise part of a new agenda for research on nonjudicial 
interpretation. 
Alexander and Schauer's attention to delineating what 
they are examining starts off as a strength in their analysis, 
separating it from other work examining nonjudicial consti-
tutional interpretation, which makes only a minimal effort 
in this regard. Alexander and Schauer suggest, for exam-
ple, the utility of distinguishing nonjudicial interpretation 
occurring in the context of "judicial inaction" from that 
which takes place where the courts have spoken on an is-
sue, arguing that the former raises no special conflict for 
nonjudicial officials who interpret the Constitution.55 But 
despite these initial attempts, a number of definitional 
problems emerge in their analysis, problems which ulti-
mately hamper the power and applicability of their thesis. 
First, the terms Alexander and Schauer use to describe 
their object of inquiry are imprecise, leading to confusion 
about exactly what they are discussing and proposing. In 
describing the general phenomenon they are arguing 
against- nonjudicial constitutional interpretation rendered 
in contexts where the courts have already spoken-they in-
voke a variety of terms including "extrajudicial constitu-
tional interpretation,"56 "nonjudicial constitutional inter-
pretation,"; "judicial non-exclusivity in constitutional 
55. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L Rev. at 1360 (cited in note 4). In claiming 
that the question of constitutional deference "is not an issue" when an official or institu-
tion agrees with a court decision, Alexander and Schauer ignore the possibility that a 
nonjudicial official might agree with the outcome of a Court decision while disagreeing 
with how the decision was arrived at, or what precedent it set. Alexander and Schauer, 
110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1363 n.l5 (cited in note 4). Additionally, nonjudicial officials might 
be concerned with how apparent "deference" to a Court's decision at one moment (when 
it concurred with the Court's policy outcome) might affect its ability to resist Court 
opinions at a later time. 
56. Id at 1359 (from the title). 
57. Id at 1360. 
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interpretation,"58 and "non-deference"59 by nonjudicial offi-
cials. Each of these phrases might plausibly be thought of 
as describing distinct interpretive activities. "Extrajudicial" 
constitutional interpretation could include interpretation 
that occurs "on top of" or as a supplement to the interpre-
tations of the courts.60 Judicial "non-exclusivity" might re-
fer to circumstances where courts have a powerful (even a 
decisive) interpretive role, but other institutions still have 
some incentive to participate in the interpretive process.61 
And "non-deference" to court decisions could describe a 
range of behaviors, from an assertion of qualified inde-
pendence from a court's decision62 to outright rejection of 
its binding authority.63 The reader of On Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation is left a bit uncertain whether 
these various concepts are used deliberately to describe 
distinct phenomena, or whether they are simply to be 
treated as fungible.64 
58. Id at 1361. 
59. Id 
60. Arguably, such "extrajudicial" constitutional construction was authorized by 
the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (allowing Congress to offer ad-
ditional constitutional protections under the Fourteenth Amendment beyond those rec-
ognized by the Court). But see, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528 (1997) 
(indicating that "[t]his is not a necessary interpretation" of Morgan). 
61. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the 
Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 587, 608, 590 (1983) (arguing that by engaging in inde-
pendent constitutional interpretation Congress "can screen the easy cases by rejecting 
unconstitutional bills ... [and] provide a different viewpoint on the Constitution and be-
come an innovative force" while still suggesting that the ··courts should examine to the 
fullest extent the constitutional implications of every piece of legislation"). 
62. See, for example, Abraham Lincoln's First Inaugural Address in which he sug-
gested that questions decided by the Supreme Court are ··entitled to very high respect 
and consideration" but that the polity is not otherwise irrevocably bound by Court rul-
ings. Fehrenbacher, ed., 2 Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1859-1865 at 221 
(cited in note 39). 
63. See, for example, President Andrew Jackson's veto of the bill to recharter the 
second Bank of the United States in which he declared that "[t]he Congress, the Execu-
tive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitu-
tion ... [t]he opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion 
of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both." 
Andrew Jackson, Veto Message of July 10, 1832 reprinted in Chester James Antieau, The 
Executive Veto App. 111 (Oceana Publications, Inc., 1988). 
64. Despite inconsistencies in defining their object of inquiry, the overall focus of 
Alexander and Schauer's critique seems to be on "non-deference": 
We call the position that we are challenging non-deference. Non-deference oc-
curs when a nonjudicial official who disagrees with a judicial decision on a con-
stitutional question does not conform her actions to that decision and perhaps 
even actively contradicts it. The nonjudicial official thus makes decisions ac-
cording to her own, rather than the court's, constitutional interpretation. Such 
an approach ... rejects judicial supremacy .... 
Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1362 (cited in note 4) (emphasis added). 
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Among the difficulties that this lack of descriptive pre-
cision gives rise to is confusion in categorizing, compre-
hending, and assessing particular political activities from 
the perspective of Alexander and Schauer's overall argu-
ment. For example, what are we to make of recent public 
criticisms of salient judicial rulings?65 Do these attacks-
including congressional calls for impeaching particular 
judges and sustained efforts to block the appointment of 
federal judges en masse-represent examples of "non-
deference" to the courts' constitutional authority? In some 
ways these initiatives, which generally avoid making 
independent assessments of the constitutional issues 
frequently at the heart of these disputes, suggest that the 
courts' interpretive authority remains uncontested. At the 
same time, however, the courts' authority in these cases 
seems to be precisely the question at issue. Similarly, what 
are we to make of recent legislative efforts seeking to 
compel the judiciary to return to its own previously 
articulated standards or principles?66 Do these activities 
represent the threat and dangers of "judicial non-
exclusivity"? One is uncertain how Alexander and Schauer 
would characterize and evaluate these developments and 
their impact on authoritative settlement. 
The nomenclature Alexander and Schauer use in de-
scribing the interpretive dynamics that they support is also 
somewhat confusing and problematic. The doctrine of ju-
dicial supremacy that Alexander and Schauer defend is 
identified as "judicial primacy without qualification,"67 "the 
question of deference,"68 "authoritative interpretation,"69 
and "judicial authoritativeness."70 These descriptions, too, 
seem less-than-synonymous.71 Overall, it is not clear how 
But, as already indicated, this account of "non-deference" lends itself to a range of dif-
ferent interpretive arrangements, not all of which need reject judicial supremacy. 
65. See Shannon P. Duffy, Report: Right Wing to Blame For Empty Federal Bench 
Seats, The Legal lntelligencer 1 (Sept. 30, 1997); Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target 
'Judicial Activism'; Conservatives Block Nominees, Threaten Impeachment and Term 
Limits, Wash. Post AI (Sept. 14, 1997); Michael Kramer, Cheap Shots at Judges, Time 57 
(Apr. 22, 1996). See generally Hearings of the Commission on Separation of Powers and 
Judicial Independence, A.B.A. (October 11, 1996). 
66. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 
2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994). 
67. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1362 (cited in note 4). 
68. Id at 1369. 
69. Id at 1373. 
70. Id at 1380. 
71. For example, as already indicated, one can imagine interpretive systems in 
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Alexander and Schauer would assess interpretive systems 
consistent with the descriptive language and categories set 
out in their piece but seemingly in tension with the tenor of 
some of their other remarks and analyses. 
These criticisms should not be dismissed as mere se-
mantic quibbling. The authors' failure to elaborate upon 
these definitional distinctions combined with their some-
what narrow analytic focus obscures potentially important 
differences among these terms, and perhaps inadvertently 
limits our political and legal imagination in thinking about 
nonjudicial constitutional interpretation.72 Alexander and 
Schauer emphasize, for example, that their argument in fa-
vor of interpretive "deference" is aimed at "nonjudicial 
public official[s],"73 an approach that leaves out an entire 
class of actors that might very well play an essential role in 
constitutional interpretation: private citizens.74 While Al-
exander and Schauer briefly note that private actors con-
tribute to the evolution of constitutional meaning by agi-
tating for legal change, it is unclear whether these 
individuals should show the same deference to the Court as 
that expected of nonjudicial officials and lower court 
judges.7 
which the Court has interpretive "primacy'' (in the sense that its rulings are primary or 
given greatest weight), while the interpretations of other branches still have some 
authority and sway. Cf. Mikva, 61 N.C. L. Rev. at 590,608 (cited in note 61). 
72. Alexander and Schauer claim, for example, that interpretive pluralism "entails 
not just parity of interpretive authority among the three branches of the federal govern-
ment" but parity among the members of "each branch ... state and local (officials] ... 
and ... among all citizens." Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1378, 1379 
(cited in note 4). But see Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A 
Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 Geo. L.J. 347, 348 (1994) (outlining a theory not of 
absolute interpretive parity but of "comparative institutional competence" in which 
"each institution must interpret the Constitution in order to decide how much deference 
to give to specific decisions by other institutions"). Note also that it is unclear why a sys-
tem with some diffusion of interpretive responsibility would require absolute "parity" 
amongst the officials within an institution; nonjudicial interpretive processes could enjoy 
at least as much structure and hierarchy as that found in ordinary policy and political 
processes. 
73. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1363 (cited in note 4). 
74. On the interpretive role of citizens in a constitutional system see Levinson, 
Constitutional Faith (cited in note 2); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in 
Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 
83 Geo. L.J. 373; Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in Sanford Levinson, ed., Re-
sponding to Imperfection (Princeton U. Press, 1995). 
75. See Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1386 (cited in note 4). It is 
not clear why Alexander and Schauer's arguments in favor of legal stability wouldn't ap-
ply equally well to political actors who do not hold official government posts. Note also 
that Alexander and Schauer's argument in favor of judicial supremacy would seem to 
apply to state officials. 
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Overall, Alexander and Schauer's definitional ambi-
guities leave one somewhat uncertain how their analysis 
fits in with the broader constellation of scholarship on 
nonjudicial constitutional interpretation. There are already 
well-developed arguments in favor of judicial supremacy 
that would bolster Alexander and Schauer's thesis, as well 
as existing analyses defending interpretative pluralism that 
they should contend with more explicitly. Without a 
clearer sense of exactly what Alexander and Schauer are 
objecting to as well as what they are endorsing, it would be 
difficult to integrate their analysis with this and other re-
lated research. 
While Alexander and Schauer at least gesture to ex-
isting studies of nonjudicial constitutional interpretation, 
Sherwin's argument about the virtues of authoritative set-
tlement and a "serious rule of obedience" to the Court's 
rulings largely ignores this larger body of work. Further-
more, Sherwin's inattention to describing what she is ob-
jecting to makes it difficult to know how to apply her 
analysis to existing scholarly discussions. Indeed, Sherwin's 
argument seems particularly abstract when compared with 
other work examining interpretation outside of the courts. 
While one can understand Sherwin's approach as a persua-
sive application of a theory of rules, it is less obvious how 
her analysis should be assessed from a more pragmatic or 
political perspective, a perspective taking into account the 
needs of our regime and the range and complexity of its di-
verse constitutional commitments. 
Indeed, Alexander, Schauer, and Sherwin's use of lan-
guage suggests a somewhat cramped understanding of the 
purposes and potential of constitutional interpretation and 
its role in our nation's political life. In focusing on the ways 
in which nonjudicial interpretation destabilizes law's "set-
tlement" function, for example, Alexander and Schauer 
tend to see constitutional interpretation as necessarily giv-
ing rise to institutional conflict and interpretive divergence. 
But there are many interpretive processes-including those 
with active nonjudicial participants-that have seemingly 
little to do with this sort of conflict (and have, therefore, lit-
tle potential to upset law's settlement and stability func-
tions). Nonjudicial actors might consult the Constitution 
not to challenge a Court's interpretation but to consider 
one of the nation's foundational political texts, in order to 
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determine some of the purposes and aspirations of the re-
public.76 
Many of the definitional problems running through the 
analyses of Alexander, Schauer, and Sherwin pervade the 
general body of scholarship looking at nonjudicial interpre-
tation. As suggested at the very beginning of this essay, 
this research suffers from typological diversity that does 
not always reflect a precise delineation of distinct objects of 
inquiry; scholars analyzing nonjudicial interpretation have 
not always been attentive to the ways in which they use 
their terms and referents and to how their work relates to 
that of others. This lack of clarity and consistency in de-
scribing exactly what is being examined both reflects and 
contributes to a general absence of synthesizing scholar-
ship,n that is, work that attempts to integrate systematically 
the diverse studies of nonjudicial interpretation in order to 
categorize, compare, and ultimately evaluate this material. 
Beyond the problems stemming from these issues, Al-
exander, Schauer, and Sherwin's analyses are weakened by 
failing to consider the contributions of existing empirical 
work examining constitutional interpretation outside of the 
courts. Alexander and Schauer explicitly identify theirs as 
76. In this way we might understand the Constitution as a fundamentally educative 
document providing "an explicit set of standards in terms of which a government can be 
judged and, when necessary, resisted. [Conceived of this way, it] is a book in which peo-
ple can read the fundamental principles of their political being." Herbert Storing, The 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra, eds., 
How Does the Constitution Secure Rights? 15, 30-31 (American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1985) (describing the views of Anti-Federalists on the role of the 
Bill of Rights). 
In addition to contracting our understanding of the purposes of constitutional inter-
pretation, Alexander, Schauer, and Sherwin's emphasis on constitutional interpretation 
as a legal activity may help to explain their conclusion that a commitment to constitu-
tionalism requires judicial supremacy. One scholar has suggested that to the extent we 
focus on the Constitution as law, we might incorrectly endorse judicial supremacy: 
If, following [John] Marshall, we base our understanding and defense of judicial 
review on the idea that "the Constitution is law," then the primacy of the Court 
in the American system of governance becomes more set. But if our basic view 
of the Constitution begins not with what the Constitution is-law-but with 
what it established-a constitutional democracy of separated powers, checked 
and balanced-then the activity of judicial review becomes part of an inter-
locking totality of governance. In other words, the idea of the Constitution as 
law interpreted by judges and the idea of the Constitution as a framework for 
limited government may well lead to different results. 
Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy at 71 (cited in note 1). 
77. Some exceptions to this observation include Burgess, Contest for Constitutional 
Authority: The Abortion and War Powers Debates (cited in note 36) and Gant, 24 Hast. 
Const. L.Q. at 359 (cited in note 2). 
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a "normative inquiry" that is "neither empirical nor his-
torical," and Sherwin's analysis suggests a similar orienta-
tion.78 But this commitment to a strictly theoretical ap-
proach to the problem of nonjudicial interpretation 
compromises these authors' resulting assessments and con-
clusions. In eschewing sustained historical analysis, for ex-
ample, they fail to appreciate both the diversity of forms 
that nonjudicial constitutional interpretation can assume as 
well as the longstanding and dynamic role it has played in 
our nation's political processes.79 Alexander and Schauer's 
ahistoricism also contributes to their somewhat static and 
insular view of how challenges to judicial supremacy are 
generally perceived: "[the] argument [that nonjudicial offi-
cers should interpret the Constitution independently of the 
Court] is not only widely accepted today, but it has also 
enjoyed a remarkable persistence."80 In fact, nonjudicial 
officials' understanding that they should independently in-
terpret the Constitution appears to have a historically con-
tingent character, an observation that has already been 
made by those who have documented historical changes in 
constitutional interpretation and the evolution of our cur-
rent system of judicial supremacy.81 
78. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1369 (cited in note 4). 
79. See, e.g., Currie, The Constitution in Congress (cited in note 36); Whittington, 
Constitutional Construction (cited in note 28). 
80. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1360 (cited in note 4). Alexander 
and Schauer insist that "most scholars, most officials, and, we suspect, many ordinary 
citizens believe that even when the Supreme Court has spoken" nonjudicial officials are 
not required to follow its interpretation. Id (references omitted). But there are good 
reasons to think that to the extent one can accurately describe a scholarly, political, and 
popular consensus on the question of who has ultimate interpretive authority, the reverse 
situation is actually at hand. If anything, "most scholars, most officials" and a majority of 
"ordinary citizens" seem to uphold the view espoused by Alexander and Schauer-the 
view that nonjudicial officials are duty-bound to follow the Constitution as it is construed 
by the Supreme Court and not as they see fit. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Constitution Con-
fuses Most Americans; Public 11/-/nformed on U.S. Blueprint, Wash. Post A13 (Feb. 15, 
1987) (referring to a national survey in which "Six in 10 of those responding said correctly 
that the Supreme Court is the final authority" on constitutional questions, emphasis 
added); Gant, 24 Hast. Const. L.Q. at 362 (cited in note 2) (discussing the views of the 
public and legal scholars on the question of judicial supremacy); Agresto, The Supreme 
Court and Constitutional Democracy at 102 (cited in note 1) ("the common public and 
academic opinion of judicial power today firmly supports a rather simple doctrine of ju-
dicial finality, a notion that the Court is, in brief, the last word in constitutional govern-
ment"). 
81. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to 
Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 57 (1986), Fisher, Presidential War Power 
(cited in note 36); Keith Whittington, Oppositional Presidents and Judicial Negotiations: 
Judicial Authority in Political Time (paper presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, September 3-6). 
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Alexander, Schauer, and Sherwin's unwillingness to 
blend theoretical and empirical research is replicated in the 
broader scholarship examining nonjudicial interpretation 
of the Constitution. In large part, existing research in this 
area consists of either empirically based work arguing that 
traditional accounts of judicial supremacy misdescribe 
American politics, or theoretical and normative analyses of 
why judicial supremacy is a flawed or desirable basis for a 
system of constitutional interpretation. While classifying 
the scholarship into these two broad camps is somewhat 
crude,82 in general the research does not systematically ex-
plore the connections between these two analytic tacks, in-
cluding the ways in which they could productively inform 
one another. Thus, normative proposals for ending the in-
terpretive hegemony of the judiciary and moving to some 
other interpretive scheme often suffer from needless ab-
straction, analytic vagueness, or misplaced anxiety about 
how such schemes would function in practice, concerns that 
might well be overcome by engaging in systematic studies 
of the ways in which nonjudicial constitutional construction 
has actually been conducted. 
IV. AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The problems illustrated by Alexander, Schauer, and 
Sherwin's essays and the inadequacies of the general litera-
ture examining nonjudicial constitutional interpretation 
point to a number of issues and concerns that should guide 
future research. In the remainder of this essay, I propose a 
four-point agenda for scholarship on nonjudicial interpre-
tation: this research should give greater attention to (1) 
definitional efforts as well as (2) empirical studies; in addi-
tion, it should (3) explore the relationship between the 
constitutional separation of powers and nonjudicial inter-
pretation, and ( 4) reflect back upon what our scholarly dis-
C~)Veries tell us about the needs and problems of our re-
gtme. 
82. I concede that some of the more "empirical" work makes important normative 
arguments or prescriptive claims, and many of the most theoretical critiques of judicial 
supremacy (or nonjudicial interpretation) are at least partially grounded in empirical in· 
vestigations that highlight and dramatize the supposedly deleterious effects of these sys-
tems. 
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The importance of renewed attention to definitional 
and empirical analysis has already been indicated, but a 
few additional points should be made. First and most ob-
viously, by elucidating precisely what is being studied, and 
by delineating (and choosing from) different conceptions of 
judicial and nonjudicial interpretation, scholars would be in 
a position to announce confidently what their work has de-
termined, and how their inquiries build upon, diverge from, 
or contradict the work of others. In this way researchers 
could identify emerging intellectual fault lines and promote 
increasingly sophisticated and integrated scholarly discus-
sions. In addition, by better understanding exactly what 
their studies entail and prescribe, scholars would make 
clear what questions and phenomena they are not investi-
gating, helping us to understand what is distinctive about 
the questions and problems associated with nonjudicial in-
terpretation. 
Future research that draws upon sustained empirical 
analyses would make several important contributions to 
our understanding of interpretation outside the courts. 
First, this scholarship would continue a project already be-
gun: correcting popular and professional misconceptions 
about judicial supremacy and its place in American poli-
tics.83 Scholars who pay little attention to historical and 
empirical research tend to adhere (often implicitly) to one 
of two dubious claims: (1) nonjudicial interpretation has 
never been an important aspect of American politics, and 
judicial supremacy has been the interpretive norm since 
our founding,84 or (2) robust, independent interpretation by 
nonjudicial actors has been and remains the norm in our 
political order.85 Future work would need to test these 
claims and explore whether different conceptions of nonju-
dicial interpretation might better describe its historic de-
velopment and current form.86 
83. See text accompanying note 80. 
84. See, e.g., Mikva, 61 N.C. L. Rev. at 609 (cited in note 61) (claiming that "[e]ven 
from the earliest years of the Republic, the Congressional Record casts little light on the 
great constitutional debates that have periodically divided the country"). 
85. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues (Princeton U. Press, 1988) (es-
pecially chapter 7). 
86. Some useful research along these lines has already been conducted. See, e.g., 
Whittington, Oppositional Presidents (cited in note 81); Hickok, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 217 (cited 
in note 40), Brest, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 57 (cited in note 81 ). 
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Constructing bridges between empirical and theoreti-
cal work would also help to bring different scholars into 
productive conversation, collaboration, and disagreement. 
While scholars in law, history, and political science have all 
studied nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpre-
tation, their efforts are, at times, needlessly insulated from 
one another.87 Finally, increased attention to empirical re-
search would help scholars assess the implications of the 
debate on nonjudicial interpretation by illustrating the con-
sequences of various forms of interpretive pluralism. By 
tracking the interpretive dynamics that have developed 
throughout American history, and by considering how 
nonjudicial interpretation has been worked out in particu-
lar political settings, we will be better able to assess the ef-
fects of a range of different interpretive systems. Implicit 
in the contemporary debates on nonjudicial interpretation 
is the assumption that the question of who interprets has a 
substantive or political importance (or, most likely, both), 
but the exact nature of this siinificance needs to be clari-
fied, illustrated, and explained. 
In addition to giving increased attention to definitional 
issues and empirical studies, future work examining nonju-
dicial interpretation should pay special attention to what is 
arguably the distinctive American contribution to constitu-
tionalism: the separation of powers. Conceiving of the 
problem of nonjudicial interpretation as inextricably linked 
with the Constitution's separation of powers system offers 
several insights. First, one should note that the Constitu-
tion's "partial intermixture" of departmental powers 
strongly suggests that judicial supremacy- at least in any 
unnuanced form- runs counter to basic assumptions and 
commitments of the American republic. As a critical com-
ponent of an intricate system of "auxiliary precautions" de-
signed to protect liberty and prevent tyrannical rule, the 
87. See, e.g., Paulsen, 83 Geo. L.J. 217 (cited in note 40) and Currie, The Constitu-
tion in Congress (cited in note 36) (legal scholars); Burgess, Contest for Constitutional 
Authority: The Abortion and War Powers Debates (cited in note 36) (a political scientist). 
88. See Murphy, 48 Rev. Pol. 401 (cited in note 2) (discussing the importance of the 
question of "who interprets"). Existing research on nonjudicial interpretation often 
treats it as essentially identical to interpretation rendered by the courts. See, e.g., Currie, 
The Constitut!on in Congress (cited in note 36). Some recent research, however, suggests 
that constitutional interpretation is not undifferentiated in this way, an unsurprising dis-
covery given the disparate political and constitutional responsibilities of each branch. 
See Whittington, Constitutional Construction (cited in note 28); Whittington, Opposi-
tional Presidents (cited in note 81 ). 
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separation of powers is premised on the belief that it is "es-
sential to a free government" that each political depart-
ment be "connected and blended, as to give to each a con-
stitutional control over the others."89 This commitment to 
an imperfect division of institutional powers and functions 
suggests that "the power to interpret law is not the sole 
province of the judiciary; rather, it is a divided, shared 
power not delegated to any one branch but ancillary to the 
functions of all of them within the spheres of their enumer-
ated powers. "90 
Exploring the nexus between constitutional interpreta-
tion and the separation of powers should also induce schol-
ars to think more systematically about the ways in which 
the different departments must consult the Constitution in 
order to understand, fulfill, and protect the institutional du-
ties, roles, and responsibilities distinctive to each branch.91 
Similarly, future research should attempt to account for 
and explain in a more systematic manner the ways in which 
the different branches recognize and ne~otiate the bounda-
ries marking their constitutional powers. 
Future scholarship on nonjudicial constitutional inter-
pretation should be attentive to a fourth and final consid-
eration. Debates about the relative merit of different in-
terpretive arrangements should be evaluated in light of the 
commitments and needs of the political regime as a whole.93 
This approach requires us to articulate and reexamine our 
nation's constitutional foundations in order to consider 
89. Federalist 48 (Madison) at 308 (cited in note 18). 
90. Paulsen, 83 Geo. L.J. at 221 (cited in note 40). Given the modem pervasiveness 
of the understanding that we live in a polity of "separated institutions sharing powers" it 
is curious that so few scholars conceive of constitutional interpretation as a power shared 
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Richard Neustadt, Presidential 
Power and the Modern Presidents 29 (John Wiley & Sons, 1990). As John Agresto notes, 
"[c]hecks and balances seem fine in theory, but highly suspicious when applied to the 
Court." Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy at 100 (cited in note 
1 ). 
91. See text accompanying notes 27-33. 
92. For an example of one scholarly effort along these lines see Eisgruber, 83 Geo 
L.J. 347 (cited in note 72). In general, greater attention to the relationship between in-
terinstitutional relationships and nonjudicial revie.w would also help to expand what 
tends to be a scholarly focus "either on the institutional competence of the branches or 
on the propriety of nonjudicial constitutional interpretation." Neal Devins, The Consti-
tution Between Friends, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 213,217 (1988). 
93. See generally, Stephen Salkever, Aristotle's Social Science in Carnes Lord and 
David K. O'Connor, eds., Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science 11-
48 (U. of California Press, 1991) (outlining an "Aristotelian" approach to scholarship 
that targets these general concerns). 
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both the ideal and extant relationship between this founda-
tion and the processes through which constitutional inter-
pretation is rendered; such a perspective would enable us 
to reconsider existing dynamics of constitutional interpre-
tation, imagine alternatives to our current interpretive or-
der, and gain renewed insight into problems resulting from 
disjunctions between our fundamental political commit-
ments and contemporary interpretive practices.94 Scholars 
could also use this reassessment of the purposes of nonju-
dicial interpretation as an opportunity to reflect upon the 
role of citizens95 and the states96 as constitutional interpret-
ers. 
The problems of On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpreta-
tion and Ducking Dred Scott: A Response to Alexander and 
Schauer illustrate both the remaining challenges facing the ex-
panding body of scholarship examining nonjudicial constitu-
tional interpretation and the great potential of this literature to 
broaden our legal and political understanding. By defining their 
inquiries with care and precision, by invoking empirical research 
to ground and test theoretical claims, and by returning to the 
separation of powers framework and the foundations of Ameri-
can constitutionalism, those studying this phenomenon will en-
94. In addition to expanding our understanding of the Constitution's role in politics 
we might, for example, gain renewed leverage on contemporary political problems, espe-
cially in circumstances where robust constitutional politics appear to have been replaced 
with "ordinary" policy and political disputes. Consider in this regard contemporary frus-
tration with the judicial confirmation process. See Jeffrey K. Tulis, Constitutional Abdi-
cation: The Senate, The President, and Appointments to the Supreme Court, 47 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 1331 (1997) (discussing historical changes in how Supreme Court confirma-
tion hearings are conducted); Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up 
the Federal Appointments Process (Harper Collins, 1994) (offering a critique of the cur-
rent judicial appointments process). 
95. For an account suggesting the necessity of active, independent constitutional 
interpretation amongst the citizenry see Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism at 376 
(cited in note 74) ("If one does honor the Constitution for the specific values it presuma-
bly instantiates, then should not all citizens serve as 'monitors' of the constitutional fidel-
ity of their officials?"); see generally Levinson, Constitutional Faith (cited in note 2). Al-
ternatively one might argue that one of the purposes of American constitutionalism is to 
remove citizens from constitutional questions (at least under ordinary circumstances). 
See, e.g., Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy at 100 (cited in note 
1) (the separation of powers and overall structure of the Constitution "allow[s) the sov-
ereign people to go about their daily lives and endeavors securely, without the need for 
absolute vigilance ... or perpetual daily oversight over every branch and department 
power"). 
96. See, e.g., Murphy, 48 Rev. Pol. at 420 n.28 (cited in note 2) (discussing "confed-
erational departmentalism"). See generally, Keith Whittington, The Political Constitu-
tion of Federalism in Antebellum America: The Nullification Debate as an Illustration of 
Informal Mechanisms of Constitutional Change, 26 Publius 1 (1996). 
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sure that their work is useful to scholars and citizens alike. 
While not every project on nonjudicial interpretation requires 
systematic attention to each of these agenda items, attending to 
these points will help identify what intellectual progress has been 
made, target enduring problems and questions, and keep schol-
arship relevant to the concerns and needs of the polity. 
